We study persistence in the geographic variation in market shares of branded goods in consumer packaged goods industries across 50 U.S. city-markets. We match scanner data on local market shares and survey data on local quality perceptions for the largest brands in 34 consumer packaged goods industries. These data are then matched with historic information on the year and US city-market in which each brand was rst launched. We nd that these consumer brands have persistently higher market shares in markets closest to their respective cities-of-origin than in markets farthest from their respective cities-of-origin, where they were typically launched later. For 6 of the 34 industries, we collected more complete historic entry data with which we can determine the local order of entry among the top brands in each of the 50 U.S. city-markets. We nd a persistent eect from dierences in the order-of-entry of competing brands on their current relative brand shares and quality perceptions across US cities. The historic order of entry also appears to correlate with the current rank-order of brand shares across cities, leading to large asymmetries across markets in brand shares and in quality perceptions. This persistence is particularly striking since many of the brands studied herein originated during the mid-to-late 19 th and early 20 th centuries, roughly a century prior to the sample period of the market share and quality perception data.
I Introduction
Branding constitutes one of the central elements to the study and practice of product marketing.
Despite a substantial literature documenting the impact of brands on consumer preferences, remarkably little is known about the economic implications of branding and the organization of markets characterized by heavy branding investments. Our interest herein is to document several stylized facts regarding persistence in the market structure of Consumer Packaged Goods (CPG) industries, arguably one of the most important sectors characterized by large advertising outlays and branding investments. We exploit geographic variation in brand origins to establish a connection between current cross-market patterns in demand and brand history. In this respect, we investigate the role of CPG brand history in the determination of current market structure.
CPG industries provide a unique opportunity for researchers to study the economic implications of branding because information on most of the marketing investments and the resulting brand sales performance are available for a wide cross-section of product categories and local U.S. markets. Many CPG products are dierentiated primarily by their brand identity. In some cases, consumers cannot distinguish between competing CPG products in blind tests (Keller 2003, p.62 and Allison and Uhl 1964) . Finally, the overall food industry reached roughly $950 billion in 2004, with almost 50% deriving from retail sales, making consumer packaged goods a branding case study of considerable economic importance.
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We collect a unique and comprehensive database for the purpose of describing industrial market structure in CPG industries. Our main data, covering 34 CPG industries, come from AC Nielsen and Information Resources Inc. (IRI). The typical CPG industry in our database consists of longitudinal scanner marketing data for all the brands covering 36-39 months for a cross section of 50 large market areas, as designated by either AC Nielsen or IRI. We supplement these data with Young and Rubicam Brands' survey-based information on geographic variation in brand quality perceptions and brand attitudes. Finally, and perhaps most notably, we collected manually the historic launch patterns for the largest brands in 6 of the CPG industries across the 50 geographic markets in our database. Consulting various sources including company archives, history books, and published company histories, we trace the entry patterns (i.e. the year a brand entered a local market) across our geographic cross-section of markets. Our empirical analysis builds on the nding of geographic variation in the market shares of branded goods documented in Bronnenberg et al. (2007) . Herein, we establish the persistence of these patterns, even for CPG brands that exhibit very little physical product dierentiation (e.g. dierent brands of ground coee and mayonnaise). The short temporal length, at best a few years, of most widely-available CPG scanner samples makes them inadequate for establishing persistence.
Therefore, we match the scanner data with manually-collected historic entry data, enabling us to focus on a much longer time horizon than 2 or 3 years. In the cases documented in this paper, CPG brands typically launched more than a century ago, during the middle-to-late 19 th and early 20 th centuries.
We report the results of two tests for historic persistence in the geographic variation in market shares. The rst test relates current brand shares to proximity to the brand's city-of-origin, i.e. the city in which the brand rst launched and, hence, where it has operated the longest. Across 49 current leading national CPG brands, dating back to the late 1800's and early 1900's, we nd that the current share in markets close to the city-of-origin is, on average, 12 share (i.e. percentage) points higher than the national average of 22%. Most brands in the sample launched much later in markets most distant from their city-of-origin. We nd that the current share in the markets most distant from the city-of-origin is 5 share points lower than the national average of 22%. These ndings imply that a brand's market shares are systematically higher in markets that were entered relatively early versus markets entered relatively late. The results further suggest that proximity to the city-of-origin, the location where a brand entered earliest and has therefore operated the longest, generates geographic variation in a brand's market share.
The second test relates the brands' shares for a given industry to the order-of-entry in each of the 50 geographic markets in our sample. Therefore, in addition to collecting the date and city-oforigin for a brand, we also collected the more complete geographic diusion of entry across all 50 geographic markets. These data were obtained for the leading brands in 6 of our industries.
The empirical identication of this early-mover eect requires a distinction between the impact of early entry ("state dependence") and dierences in the relative marketing competencies of rms ("heterogeneity"), a problem analogous to the incidental parameters problem (Heckman 1981 ).
The extant literature on the "pioneering advantage" has documented early-mover eects across a wide range of industries. Typically, this literature uses a single time-series within an industry (see 2 In contrast, our identication strategy uses the observed variation in the identities of the early-movers across markets within a given industry. By focusing on CPG industries with origins dating back to the 19 th century, we can safely rule-out a coordinated national brand roll-out strategy. One can therefore think of our 50 geographic markets roughly as 50 independent replications of the underlying game generating our data.
For the 6 industries in which we obtained the complete historic entry data across all the geographic markets, the historic order-of-entry appears to be a good predictor of a brand's current market share levels across geographic markets. The order of entry also appears to be a good predictor of the identity of the current market-share leader in a given market. We also use the brand quality measures to show a comparable correlation between entry and perceived brand quality levels across geographic areas. Thus, early entrants in a geographic market tend to be perceived as higher quality brands in our current data. Even though our data collection eort limits us to documenting the entry eect in 6 of the industries, we nevertheless observe comparable geographic variance in market shares and quality perceptions for all 34 industries.
To conrm the importance of entry patterns in explaining the geographic variance in brand market shares, we also investigate several alternative economic sources of asymmetry. These explanations include local cost advantages based on proximity to a brand's production facilities and relationships with large national supermarket chains. Several of these features could be inherently driven by historic entry. For example, a rm might build its plant closest to its largest market, which in turn may just be its city-of-origin. Similarly, a rm might form the deepest relationships with retailers in those markets where it has operated the longest. In spite of these arguments, the eect of early entry on brand shares is found to be robust to these alternative sources of brand asymmetry across markets. None of these sources predicts the observed geographic asymmetries in brand shares better than early entry. Moreover, the eect of early entry is signicant even after controlling for these other factors.
The relationship between historic entry and brand share is consistent with the aforementioned literature on pioneering advantage. However, our analysis makes several novel contributions in this area, including our identication strategy based on historic national diusion and our use of 2 An exception is Brown and Lattin (1994) , who use a similar multi-market approach to studying entry eects for an industry that launched during the late 1980s. However, they observe the same rst entrant in 37 out of 40 markets analyzed. Furthermore, it is much harder to justify the cross-market independence of launch in the latter 20 th century given the prevalence of national roll-outs with nationally-coordinated television advertising campaigns. brand quality information in addition to market shares. The persistence of the early-mover eect on current shares is also related to the recent ndings of persistence in dominance of manufacturers across a large cross-section of Japanese manufacturing sectors by Sutton (2007) . Our ndings of important geographic dierences in market structure also contribute to a growing literature on the economics of geography (c.f. Krugman 1991 , Ellison and Glaeser 1997 , 1999 . In this regard, we demonstrate the persistent eect of historic brand entry on the geographic variation in current CPG brand market shares. To the best of our knowledge, we are the rst to link historic entry patterns to the spatial variation of market shares across large US city markets.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section two, we describe our data and document several regularities in the market shares of the leading brands in our 31 industries. In section three, we test for a relationship between historic order-of-entry and relative brand shares.
Section four explores several alternative explanations for these geographic patterns. Section ve concludes and discusses several directions for future research.
II Data and Geographic Patterns in Market Shares

A The Data
Our primary data source is AC Nielsen scanner data for 31 CPG food industries in the 50 largest AC Nielsen-designated Scantracks as in Dhar and Hoch (1997) . These are large CPG industries representing a wide range of both edible grocery and dairy products, with collective annual national revenues of roughly $26 Billion. We treat the 50 Scantracks as independent markets, as is typically done in practice by large CPG manufacturers who use AC Nielsen scanner data for market analysis and strategic-planning. (in equivalent units) :
For the cross-sectional analysis in section III, we compute a brand i's cross-time market share in market m as follows:
The promotion data partition the total equivalent unit sales of a brand by the promotional conditions under which they were sold (i.e. on in-aisle display and/or feature ad and/or temporary discount).
We construct a promotion variable by computing the fraction of a brand's sales that was sold under any form of in-store promotion. For the 31 industries from AC Nielsen, analogous sales and marketing data are also reported at the retailer account level for those retailers in each market with local annual revenues exceeding $2MM. Account level data encompass all stores in the retail chain for the geographic market. There are 67 such retailers in the data, which jointly cover 48 of the 50 Nielsen markets. Table 1 lists the CPG food industries covered, along with each of the geographic markets and retailers in the database. In the analysis below, we report results across the 31 industries. We report a 9-group classication to identify the industries. For example, the bread industry is included in the "Bread and Bakery" group, the candy industry is included in the "Candy and Gum" group, the butter and cream cheese industries are contained in the "Dairy Products" group, the pizza industry is contained in the "Frozen Entrees/Side Dishes" group, the frozen toppings industry is contained in the "Frozen/Refrigerated Desserts" industry, the juices and coee industries are contained in the "Non-Alcoholic Beverages" group, the pasta industry is contained in the "Packaged Dry Groceries" group, the mayonnaise and fruit spreads industries are contained in the "Processed Canned/Bottled Foods" group, and dinner sausages are contained in the "Refrigerated Meats" group.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
For the historic analysis reported in section III, we supplement these 31 industries with analogous scanner data for 3 additional CPG industries: beer, ketchup, and softdrinks. These data span a more recent time horizon and cover a slightly dierent set of geographic markets and do not contain the retailer-level information.
4 However, these additional industries enable us to extend our cityof-origin analysis to 34 industries, and our historic entry analysis to 6, rather than 3, industries.
4 Two data sets (beer and ketchup) are from Information Resources, Inc (IRI) and cover demand data for 3 years In the data, a "brand" encompasses all the stock-keeping units (SKUs) sold baring a given brand name. For instance, in the ground coee category, the Folgers brand aggregates all the SKUs with the Folgers label which embodies a wide array of can sizes. Even though many of the brands are jointly owned by a small number of large food conglomerates, we examine each brand in our database as a separate entity. For instance, Folgers is now owned by P&G a large brand conglomerate, but has its own separate management team responsible for its marketing. Similarly, according to the company website, Ben & Jerry's continues to operate "to a large extent independently" and "separately from Unilever's current U.S. ice cream business" even after its acquisition by Unilever.
5 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the largest brands in those six industries for which we will also provide details on entry data, as discussed below.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
To explore the sources of persistence in the geographic brand share patterns, we supplement the Nielsen data with information on the city-of-origin of a brand. Focusing on the top 2 brands in each of the 34 industries, based on their share of national equivalent unit sales, we successfully identied the city-of-origin and year of entry for 49 of the 68 top brands. The data were collected by consulting various sources including the Internet, company relations agents, and business history books. We list the market of origin for each of these brands in Table 3 . We can see that CPG brand launches vary widely across the 19 th and 20 th centuries, with the average launch date in 1919; but with a standard deviation of 34.3 years.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
To dig deeper into the sources of persistence in geographic patterns, we also collected manually data on the exact year a brand launched in each of our 50 markets. Since such data are not readily available, we are only able to conduct this entry analysis for six of the 34 industries: beer, ground coee, ketchup, mayonnaise, softdrinks, and yogurt. These data were obtained from a large number of sources. The beer entry data were assembled from a combination of published business histories (2001) (2002) (2003) . The softdrinks data cover the entire year 2005. There are slight dierences in the set of markets covered in these 3 industries. The ketchup data span 50 IRI city markets (not the Nielsen city markets). The beer data span 47 IRI city markets, because in 3 of the 50 markets, beer is not sold through supermarkets. The softdrinks data span the 50 Nielsen Scantracks. To avoid unnecessary repetition of detail, we will refer to the share data of the 31 plus 3 industries as all covering a cross-section of 50 markets.
5 For additional documentation, see http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/press_center/press/join-forces.html. 10 Finally, the yogurt data were obtained from industry contacts.
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In some instances, an exact entry date would need to be inferred, for example by interpolation based on geographically "close" markets. For this reason, our entry analysis will focus on whether a rm entered rst instead of using the exact entry date of a brand.
For the same 6 industries in which we collected entry data, we also collected information on the exact geographic location of the manufacturing plants for the brands. The plant locations provide a measure of a brand-specic cost asymmetry based on the distance from a given geographic market to the plant. The plant locations were obtained from interviews with managers, websites and other secondary data sources. 9 Complete historic entry data for Hunts and Del Monte were unavailable primarily since their historic records have all been lost or destroyed due to various changes in ownership since their launches. We can nevertheless easily infer Heinz's early entry in most of our geographic markets due to its earlier launch and due to the availability of launch dates for Hunts and Del Monte in their respective cities-of-origin. 10 We are grateful to Tom Barber, Harriet Grossman, and Phil Mooney for their assistance using company records from the Coca-Cola Company and Joy Summar-Smith and Mary-Beth Webster for their assistance using the company history and Dr Pepper bottlers' history at the Dr Pepper archives. We also gratefully acknowledge the help of Bob Stoddard, an expert on the history of Pepsi Cola for his time and for several discussions on the origins of the success of Pepsi. The brand value measures constructed by Y&R are used by many large national consumer goods manufacturers to assess brand performance and brand equity. Consumers are surveyed by Y&R on a large number of yes/no brand characteristics such as whether a particular brand is "high quality," "good value," and "best brand in category." Responses to these ratings are tallied and reported by Y&R as fractions of the sample at the Census sub region level.
13 For each brand and sub region we use the average across the three quality measures as a proxy for perceived quality.
B The Geographic Patterns in Current Market Shares
In this section, we briey discuss the geographic patterns in market shares, using the 31 AC Nielsen industries. Due to dierences in timing and market denitions, we do not include the 3 industries with IRI data in this analysis; however, we nd analogous geographic patterns therein. For each industry, we focus on the two largest brands based on their respective shares of national equivalent unit sales, generating a sample with 2 brands, 50 geographic markets and 36 months for each of the 31 industries.
A simple analysis of the pooled variance in market shares across time and markets for each of the 62 top-two national brands reveals the important role of geography (Bronnenberg et al. 2007 ).
The geographic variance is considerably larger than time-series variation. Across the 62 brands, the distribution of R 2 for market xed-eects had a minimum of 50% and a mean of over 80%. The two right-side panels of Figure 1 illustrate a typical example of the relative importance of geography versus time using the top two brands in the mayonnaise industry. The variation in each of the brands' shares between the two markets is considerably larger than the variation over time within each market.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
We also observe variation across markets in the identity of an industry's brand-share leader.
Within an industry, a local leader dominates a maximum of 64% of the markets, on average. In only three of the 31 industries do we observe a single consistent share-leader across all markets: Cereals, 12 Although the brand quality data are sampled roughly 10 years later than brand share data, this dierence seems small compared to the timing of historic entry. Therefore, we do not think this slight discrepancy will invalidate the comparison of the entry eect on share versus on brand quality.
13 These regions divide the continental U.S. into 9 regions that consist of clusters of adjacent states, e.g., New
England, Pacic, etc.
Cream Cheese and Frozen Toppings. In some of the more fragmented industries, we see even more variation in brand leadership if we expand our focus to all top-two brands in each geographic market.
Across industries, we see an average of 8 dierent brands that are a local share-leader in at least one market, with a range of 1 to 20 (i.e. the dinner sausage industry has 20 dierent brands that are a local leader in at least one market). Therefore, the identity of the leading brand in an industry varies from market to market. This variation creates a striking degree of asymmetry in brand shares across markets. In this section, we tie the geographic patterns in market shares to a persistent eect of historic brand entry. We begin with anecdotal discussion of some of these industries to motivate the potential persistence of historic entry timing.
As seen in Table 3 14 Taken from the Folgers website (http://www.folgers.com/pressroom/history.shtml). Pendergrast (1999, p.56 ) lists an earlier date which for the purpose of our analysis is equivalent. Some of the variation in the identity of the early entrant stems from the slow diusion of a brand across the United States. During the mid to late 19 th century, when many of these brands diused, the technology to coordinate a national product launch was not widely-available (e.g. this period pre-dates national radio and national television advertising campaigns). In ground coee, for instance, it took more than a century for Folgers to achieve true national distribution. In 1978, it nally entered New England following a halt to an FTC consent decree from 1971, when Folgers was acquired by Procter and Gamble. Similarly, Miller Beer launched in Milwaukee in 1855; but it did not enter many south western markets until just after the turn of the century, fty years later.
It is important to note that in most of our industries, the current set of top brands does not consist of the true rst-entrants per se. For example, Heinz was not the rst seller of ketchup,
15
Budweiser was not the rst commercial brewer of beer and Folgers was not the rst vendor of coee.
Technically speaking, our analysis focuses on the survivors, rather than the rst-entrants (see Golder 2000 for a discussion of potential survivor bias). However, as business historians will attest, the entrepreneurs who launched these survivor brands were nevertheless pioneers in their aggressive use of grassroots marketing to build their brands both locally and, eventually, nationally. We view beer across the US (Plavachan 1973 ).
This anecdotal discussion highlights several important features of the entry data that will help us with our tests below. First, most current leading brands in an industry originated in dierent parts of the US and then diused slowly across geographic markets. This means that there is variation in how long a brand operated within a market, allowing us to test for share dierences between markets where a brand has operated relatively long and markets where it has operated relatively short. There is also variation in the identity of early entrants across markets within an industry, allowing us to test early-mover eects versus brand heterogeneity. Finally, even though we focus on the set of surviving brands, we nevertheless consider them the true pioneers since they were typically the rst to invest in serious marketing and brand-building.
A The City-of-Origin Eect on Market Shares
In this section, we test for persistence in a brand's share by looking at the relative shares in markets closest to the city-of-origin, versus in markets more distant from the city-of-origin. Since the cityof-origin represents the geographic area in which a brand has operated the longest, it is also the area with the highest probability that the brand was an early entrant. Due to the long geographic diusion of most CPG brands, we conjecture that markets more distant from the city-of-origin would also represent the areas where the brand entered more recently and, hence, where the brand is less likely to have been an early entrant. Because the analysis uses only the location of brand origin, we were able to collect the necessary data for this test for a large cross-section of brands and industries. Specically, our analysis uses 49 brands from the set of 68 top-two national brands in each of the 34 industries. These brands are listed in Table 3 .
To allow for non-linearity in the eect of distance to city-of-origin on shares we use a stepfunction approximation. The distances between a local market and a brand's city-of-origin, which range from 0 to 2702 miles, are partitioned into 11 intervals each covering 250 miles. For each interval, we create a dummy variable, Dist k icm , indicating whether the distance from market m to brand i s city-of-origin falls into interval k. A separate dummy variable, Dist 0 icm , is used to indicate whether market m is the city-of-origin. The number of observations in each distance interval ranges from 42 (2500 to 2750 miles) to 490 (750 to 1000 miles). To test for an eect of distance from city-of-origin on brand shares, we run the following regression:
where Share icm is the market share of brand i in industry c and market m and α i is a brand xedeect.
We report the distance results from (1) graphically in Figure 3 . We graph the distance eects, δ k , against their respective distance intervals. We can see that, net of the brand-specic eects α i , a brand's market share falls as we move to markets that are increasingly distant from its city-of-origin.
In particular, we see an approximately 20 share-point dierence between the market share in the city-of-origin versus in a market more than 2500 miles away. In the graph, we also report 95% condence bands to indicate that these eects are statistically signicant. Given that the overall average market share for these 49 brands is roughly 22%, the dierences between close versus distant markets are quite substantial.
We conclude that close proximity to a brand's city-of-origin correlates positively with the brand's current market share. In view of the fact that the average launch year of these brands is 1919, we also conclude that the dierence in market shares between markets entered early versus markets entered later is persistent. This persistence is remarkable given that the industries studied typically consist of fairly physically undierentiated products that tend to be available in most of the geographic markets. Using these ndings alone, it is dicult to assess a specic source for the persistence.
There are other potential explanations for why a brand would have a higher market share closer to its city-of-origin. In the next section, we explore the role of order-of-entry among the current largest surviving brands in 6 of 34 the industries. We also explore several alternative sources of geographic brand asymmetry that could also introduce persistence.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE B The Order-of-Entry Eect on Market Shares
In this section, we run a second test for persistence in 6 separate industries using variation in the order-of-entry of the current top brands. With the exception of ketchup, where we only have a complete national history for Heinz, in each industry we have entry data on more than one brand and typically use the union of all top 2-3 brands from each of the 50 cities. Hence, in beer we look Before moving to a regression analysis, it is helpful to look at the joint geographic distribution of market shares and entry. Referring back to Figure 2 , we map this distribution for the ground coee industry. Shaded circles indicate those markets in which a brand entered before the other.
For example, Folgers started in the west and moved east whereas Maxwell House started in the east and moved west. The maps reveal a strong positive correlation between a brand's share level and its early entry status in both industries.
We now test this relationship more formally. For each industry, we run several regressions using the within-market mean share for each brand as the dependent variable. Our regressors consist of brand xed-eects and "EarlyEntry," an indicator for whether a brand was the early entrant in a market:
We report the results from our market share regressions in Table 4 . In each industry, we run three regressions. The rst conditions only on EarlyEntry, the second conditions on the brand identities, and the third conditions on both. The entry eect is statistically signicant in all 6 industries, even after controlling for brand xed-eects. It is helpful to look rst at the regressions with brand eects only to understand the magnitude of the EarlyEntry eect. With the exception of the ketchup industry, for which we could only obtain data for the leading brand, we routinely nd evidence of asymmetries in the average brand shares across markets. But, after conditioning on EarlyEntry, we nd that the magnitude of the EarlyEntry eect exceeds the brand eects. This result is suggestive that early entry determines the rank order of brand shares even in the softdrinks (at least for Coca Cola and Pepsi) and yogurt industries, where the EarlyEntry eect is relatively small compared to coee and mayonnaise. According to our point estimates, EarlyEntry accounts for the majority of the predicted share dierential in each industry except for Ketchup. For example, 16 In mayonnaise, we exclude Duke's and Blue Plate because they operate in too few markets to separate heterogeneity and state-dependence. However, we use the information on their entry to determine those markets where neither Unilever nor Kraft entered rst.
in coeee, the rank order of brands across markets is associated with EarlyEntry.
In several instances, the denition of EarlyEntry was problematic. In a separate Appendix, we check the robustness of our regression results to alternative denitions of the EarlyEntry variable.
Our ndings herein are qualitatively the same under these alternative denitions.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE C The Entry Eect on Perceived Brand Qualities
In this section, we look at the eect of EarlyEntry on perceived brand quality dierences across markets. Given that the leading brands in each of the 6 industries invest heavily in national television advertising, one might expect to observe more uniformity in consumers' perceptions of the brand qualities. In Table 5 , we report the results for each industry of the analogous three regressions used in the last section with the brand quality data. Since the brand quality is measured on an ordinal scale, it is hard to assign any quantitative meaning to the coecients. The eect of early entry is positive, statistically signicant, with the exception of the beer industry, and has a fair amount of explanatory power in all the industries. Thus, the eect of entry, often during the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, continues to persist in the geographic dierences of current brand quality perceptions.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE IV Alternative Explanations for the Geographic Variance in Shares
In the previous section, we found that entry appears to have a fairly strong and persistent eect on current market shares. We now explore several alternative supply-side sources of rm and market heterogeneity that could also potentially contribute to the observed geographic variation in market shares. Since several of these sources could also be a result of early entry, it is interesting to see whether our entry eects are mitigated by these additional controls. First, we consider geographic cost advantages based on a brand's proximity to its production plant (Greenhut, Greenhut, and Li 1980) . Second, we test for relationships with specic multi-market retailers. For example, manufacturers frequently pay slotting allowances to retailers to obtain premium shelf space for their products (Federal Trade Commission 2001, Israilevich 2004, Sudhir et al. 2004 ). Third, we look for parent company eects whereby a large food company might possess regional advantages that are passed on to each of its brands. We also look at the potential role of trade promotions, such as price discounts and other point-of-purchase merchandising that could also potentially inuence a brand's market share.
A Costs and Promotions
Focusing again on the 6 industries for which we have entry data, Table 6 contrasts the entry eect with two other sources of rm heterogeneity across markets: location of plants and local dierences in promotional intensity. In the last column, we report a regression that reports the entry eect after controlling for both these alternative sources of geographic variation. Column one, titled Brand Eects, provides a baseline with only the brand eects for an industry.
Column two, titled Distance Eects, adds the eect of the distance from a given market to a brand's geographically closest manufacturing plant. There are two reasons why proximity to production plant might depend on or be confounded with entry. First, rms may tend to have their plants in their oldest markets where they rst began operations and, hence, where they were more likely to have been the early entrant. Second, if there is an entry eect on market share, rms might subsequently build new plants closest to these markets if they prefer to invest near their largest markets. In either case, cost would likely appear to have a large eect and, if so, could potentially oer an explanation for the entry eects documented in the previous section. For most of the industries, the eect is found to be insignicant, suggesting that cost advantages are not the driving force of the geographic patterns in those industries. Nevertheless, proximity to plant is found to be negative and signicant for the beer and ketchup industries. Thus, in these industries, a brand's share appears to decline in markets further from production facilities. In spite of this nding, we see that the entry eect remains positive and signicant in both industries, suggesting that the eect of entry is robust to the eects of proximity to plant.
Column three, titled Promotion Eects, instead adds promotional intensity (i.e. share of equivalent unit sales sold on promotion). A potential concern is that the promotion variable is confounded with the entry eect, which could indeed arise if rms systematically target higher promotional eort to their largest-share markets. Many CPG rms do use what is termed a high-BDI allocation rule for promotional budgets. BDI refers to the Brand Development Index and the rule implies that promotions are allocated to markets where the brand is strong as a defensive tactic (Blattberg and Neslin 1991) . In half of the industries, the correlation between market share and promotions is very small and insignicant. Nevertheless, the correlation is positive and signicant in the beer, cola and yogurt industries. Clearly one must be cautious in interpreting these eects due to the potential simultaneity of promotions and shares. In spite of this limitation, it is surprising to observe relatively little correlation between promotion levels and the cross-section of shares in the industries.
17 Column 4 adds the entry variable to the regression with the distance and local promotion eects concurrently. With the exception of yogurt, the entry eect remains positive and signicant in all the industries even after controlling for promotions and plant locations.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE B Relationships with Retail Chains
Another potential source of geographic variation in market shares is the impact of retail intermediaries. The practice of slotting-fees could enable a manufacturer to establish a relationships with specic multi-market (or national) retail chains, which could in turn generate regional advantages in distribution. The conventional wisdom is that slotting fees are paid to the corporate headquarters of a large chain and not to individual store managers (Alexander 2003) . In spite of the entry eects documented earlier, such relationships with retailers might nevertheless be the main driving force of the geographic patterns in our data. We can test this eect by checking whether brand share variation exhibits a retail account component in the retail account level data. A retail account roughly corresponds to the set of stores for a retail chain located in a specic geographic market which may consist of multiple city-markets. We exploit the retail account level information for the top two brands in each of the 31 industries for which we use AC Nielsen data. We re-compute the analysis of variance in shares, as in section B, except that we now study the role of retail account in addition to time and geographic market. A separate regression is run for each industry. Although not reported, the R 2 from retail account xedeects are very small compared to market xed-eects. Across all industries, the retail component 17 In contrast, promotions are more correlated with shares in market-specic the time-series. A separate regression of shares on promotions for each of the top two brands was run for each industry and each of the 50 markets. That is, we ran 100 regressions per industry (2 brands and 50 markets). On average, the R accounts for 20% of share variation, on average, whereas the market component accounts for more than 51%. For a few of the smaller industries, retailer eects are larger due to the fact that not all retailers carry them (e.g. refrigerated pasta) or that private labels are strong in some chains and not others. The left panels of Figure 1 illustrate these ndings by plotting the market share history of the top brands in the mayonnaise industry in two separate large retail accounts: Albertsons in Los Angeles and Albertsons in Denver. By comparing these plots with the righ-side panels, with timeseries plots at the city level, we can see that the market-specic component of the share histories is considerably more inuential than the retailer component. In summary, the evidence suggests that retailers are not the driving force of the geographic variation in market shares. Note that we can only focus this analysis on those chains with operations in at least two distinct geographic markets (e.g. Albertsons, Safeway and Krogers) as we cannot separately identify a retailer and a market eect for single-market retailers. Thus, we cannot rule-out that single-market chains sell a higher share of the local leading brand due to slotting fees.
V Conclusions and Discussion
A simple descriptive analysis of CPG brand shares in Bronnenberg et al. (2007) reveals that market shares of national CPG brands are strikingly dierent across geography. Herein, we study the persistence of these geographic dierences in brand shares over time. In particular, we nd a cityof-origin eect for the leading brands across 49 brands covering almost all the industries studied.
National brands have larger market shares in markets that are geographically close to their cityof-origin and smaller market shares in markets far away from the city-of-origin, where they were typically launched later. We conjecture this city-of-origin eect is due to the fact that most current surviving brands were early-entrants in their markets-of-origin. To test the early-entry eect more carefully, we exploit the geographic variation in the identity of the early entrants amongst the top surviving brands for 6 of the industries. In all 6 industries, we nd not only that early entry correlates signicantly with brand shares, it also correlates with quality perceptions and with the rank-order of brand shares. These ndings are found to be robust to several alternative economic sources of asymmetry across markets.
Thus, we conclude that for the industries studied, the historic entry patterns of brands have left their mark on the current market shares and quality perceptions of brands of physically very similar products. Given these ndings, we can foresee at least two interesting directions for future research. are less robust to model specication, they nevertheless conform with our empirical ndings of covariance between order-of-entry and market structure in our data.
An alternative line of argumentation is that persistence arises from inertia in brand preferences.
That is, consumers form brand buying habits which create an early-mover eect. Schmalensee However, none of these studies have made a connection between inertia and any initial advantages (such as entry) for a given brand and its market share. Testing this theory against the ESC with sequential entry is beyond the scope of the data used herein.
A second avenue for future research is to ask whether the persistent historic eects in an industry can be re-initialized, or analogously, to study what constitutes early entry. Anecdotally, innovations to a product or to its packaging might constitute suciently disruptive events in an industry to re-initialize it. For example, Digiorno's radical launch of rising-crust pizza permanently altered the market structure of the frozen pizza industry (Bronnenberg and Mela, 2004) . In terms of packaging, in the coee market, Hills Brothers was the rst to introduce vacuum sealed cans of coee, a technology it rolled out in conjunction with a massive free-samples campaign during the early 1930s in Chicago (Wilson 1969) , where it remains the largest brand in terms of market share in our data. 
A Robustness Checks for the Order of Entry Eect
In some instances, the exact denition of EarlyEntry was dicult and required a judgement call.
We briey explore the robustness of the precise way we dened EarlyEntry in certain industries to conrm that our ndings are robust.
In the ketchup industry, we only observe the entry dates for Heinz, and we dene EarlyEntry to be 1 if Heinz entered a market before 1890, which is the initial launch year for its main rival, Hunts.
In the mayonnaise industry, it was not always possible to determine the exact year for each city but only for a broader geographic region. In section B, we assumed that Kraft was the early entrant in the midwest and sourthern markets for which we could not locate an exact date. Two alternative, and possibly more conservative, approaches would be to assume Unilever was the early entrant in these markets or, simply, to re-estimate the model dropping the problematic markets entirely. In Table 7 , we report the results from the market share regressions for these two alternative approaches.
EarlyEntry is found to be positive and signicant under both alternative denitions.
In the softdrink industry, we faced a dierent issue. Unlike Coke and Dr. Pepper, Pepsi was never the rst brand to roll out in any of the 50 cities in the data. Technically, Coca-Cola was the rst to enter the North East even though Pepsi is the current share leader in that region.
According to Bob Stoddard, a leading brand historian with expertise in the soft drinks industry, Pepsi intentionally re-launched with aggressive marketing in the North East during the early 1930's precisely because of the lack of major marketing eort by incumbents.
In section B, we dened
Pepsi as the Early Entrant in the North East. In Table 7 , we re-run the market share regression dening Coca-Cola as the early entrant in the North East. We nd that the entry eect is robust to this alternative denition and that most of the parameters do not change qualitatively. In Table 7 , we re-run the market share regression dening Budweiser as the early entrant. The EarlyEntry parameter is still found to be positive and signicant. Whiskers indicate 95% condence intervals.
